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Criminal Rules
By WILLIAM H. FORTUNE*
INTRODUCTION
In May 1978 the Kentucky Supreme Court set up a Criminal
Rules Revision Committee (Advisory Committee) to study Ken-
tucky's Rules of Criminal Procedure. The purpose of the Advis-
ory Committee was to make recommendations to the Judicial
Council. The committee met sixteen times between July 1978
and July 1980, and at the conclusion of its study, submitted a
comprehensive revision of the rules of criminal procedure to the
judicial council. These proposed revisions went beyond mere
amendment of the existing rules. The Advisory Committee drew
heavily from the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,' and ulti-
mately proposed extensive changes in plea bargaining, grand
jury practice, discovery and sentencing.
On July 3, 1980 the Judicial Council submitted the proposed
rules to the Kentucky Supreme Court. The Court received writ-
ten comments and held a public hearing on December 9, 1980.
At that time, Justice Robert Stephens was appointed to chair a
committee of the Court to consider the proposed rules in light of
written and oral comments received by the Court-many of
which were addressed to a proposal to do away with jury sen-
tencing. On June 12, 1981 the Supreme Court entered an order
amending the criminal rules, and the amendments went into ef-
fect on September 1, 1981. The order represented the Court's
modification of the proposals of the Advisory Committee. Some
proposals were adopted without change; others were modified
Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. J.D. 1964, University of Kentucky.
'Telephone interview with Jean Collier, Kentucky Administrative Office of the
Courts (Mar. 22,1982). The Criminal Rules Advisory Committee was chaired by Circuit
Judge Thomas Spain and included the following members: Circuit Judge J.B. Johnson;
John K. Carter and Leonard Kopowski, both district judges; James E. McDaniel and
Larry S. Roberts, both Commonwealth attorneys; County Attorney Thomas Sayars; Assis-
tant Attorney General James Ringo; Professor Robert Lawson; State Representative
Charles R. Holbrook; Terrence Fitzgerald and David Murrett, both public defenders; and
William Thurman, Elizabeth Oberst, and Kathy Peale, all of the Administrative Office of
the Courts.
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
by the Court. Many committee proposals-including the contro-
versial proposal for judge sentencing-were rejected, and the
Court originated a number of changes in the 1981 amendments
itself. The Advisory Committee had included a proposed "Offi-
cial Commentary" with a number of rules, but the Court neither
adopted any of the proposed commentary nor generated its own
commentary. 2
This article addresses the major changes in criminal proce-
dure effected by the 1981 amendments. Reference is made where
appropriate to the Advisory Committee proposals and its pro-
posed "Official Commentary." The commentary provides insight
into the intent of the drafters of rules adopted by the Court with-
out change. No attempt is made in this article to discuss the com-
mittee proposals which were not adopted.
I. INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (RCr)
A. Warrantless Arrests
An arrest is effected by either placing the person being ar-
rested under restraint or by that person submitting to the control
of the arresting officer.3 A peace officer' can arrest without a
warrant:
(1) for a felony or misdemeanor committed in his presence;5
(2) when he has reasonable grounds to believe that the person
to be arrested has committed a felony;6
(3) when he has probable cause to believe that the person has
committed larceny in a retail or wholesale establishment; 7
(4) when he has probable cause to believe that the person has
wantonly or intentionally caused physical injury to a
2 Id.
3 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.025(2) (Bobbs-Merrill 1975) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
4 A private person can arrest without a warrant when a felony has been committed
and when the person effecting the arrest has reasonable grounds to believe that the person
to be arrested has committed the crime. KRS § 431.005(4) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
5 KRS§ 431.005(1)(b) & (d) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
6 KRS § 431.005(1)(c) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
7 KRS § 433.236(3) (Cum. Supp. 1980). This is part of the shoplifting statute which
gives merchants the right to detain, search and question shoplifting suspects. Subsection
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member of his family, and that the person will present a
danger or threat of danger to others if not immediately re-
strained;8
(5) for violations9 committed in the presence of the officer
which, by their nature, ordinarily require that the accused
be taken into custody;10 and
(6) for violations committed in his presence if the officer has
reasonable grounds to believe the accused will not honor a
citation."
An officer may not enter a private residence or office to make an
arrest without an arrest or search warrant, absent exigent cir-
cumstances or consent.12
RCr 3.02(2), as amended, provides that any person making a
warrantless arrest shall take the accused before a judge without
unnecessary delay and file with the court a post-arrest com-
plaint, specifying the offense for which the arrest was made and
the facts constituting probable cause to believe that the offense
(3) gives peace officers the authority to arrest on probable cause for misdemeanor thefts
not committed in the presence of the officer. This statute thus eliminates the need for the
merchant to swear to a complaint before a judicial officer, since the merchant's report to
the investigating officer ordinarily will constitute probable cause.
8 KRS § 431.005(2) (Curn. Supp. 1980). If the abused person is an adult, the peace
officer must request that within twelve hours he or she sign a statement, which need not
be sworn, setting out the facts of the assault. If the abused person refuses to sign such a
statement, the charges must be dismissed. The probable intent of this statute is to permit a
peace officer to make a warrantless arrest in misdemeanor assault cases (KRS § 408.030
(1975)) when he has probable cause to believe that the accused has injured a family mem-
ber and will do so again after the police leave the residence.
9 Offenses punishable by death or imprisonment in a penitentiary are defined asfel-
onies; offenses punishable by confinement other than in the penitentiary are defined as
misdemeanors; and offenses punishable only by fine or punishment other than death or
imprisonment are defined as violations. KRS § 431.060 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
10 KRS § 431.005(1)(e) (Cum. Supp. 1980) lists the following offenses which, when
committed in the officer's presence, justify arrest without a warrant: (1) KRS § 189.290
(1980)-reckless driving; (2) KRS § 189.393 (1980)-failure to comply with traffic offi-
cer's signal; (3) KRS § 189.520 (1980)-driving under the influence; (4) KRS § 189.580
(1980)-leaving the scene of an accident; (5) KRS § 511.080 (1975)-criminal trespass in
the third degree; and (6) KRS § 525.070 (1975)-harassment.
11 KRS § 431.015(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
12 In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), the Supreme Court held that, absent
exigent circumstances or consent, an arrest warrant is required to enter the home of a sus-
pect to arrest him. In Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), the Supreme Court
answered affirmatively the question reserved in Payton; that is, whether a search warrant
is required to enter the home of a third person to arrest a suspect.
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was committed.13 The post-arrest complaint must be signed by
the person making the arrest, but need not be verified. The rule
further provides that "[i]f no judge is available in (he county in
which the arrest was made the defendant shall be taken to jail, in
which case any documents relating to the arrest shall be given to
the jailer."14 If the accused does not post bond, the jailer is to take
him before a judge without unnecessary delay.'5 In any event
"[a]ny documents relating to the arrest that are in the possession
of the jailer shall be delivered to the clerk [of the court] on or be-
fore the next business day."' 6
Amended RCr 3.02 raises several points worthy of particular
attention. The proposed commentary to the rule, as drafted by
the rules Advisory Committee, was as follows:
This amendment formally establishes the use of a "post-
arrest complaint" document when there is an arrest without a
warrant. While not sworn to, it is signed by the arresting offi-
cer and will set out why the officer believes there was probable
cause to make the arrest. This document will follow the defen-
dant to court. If the defendant is arrested at such time that tak-
ing him to court is impracticable, he may be taken to jail for a
short period of time, and the officer leaves the post-arrest com-
plaint with the jailer, whose duty it is to see that the defendant
is taken before the judge at the proper time. The jailer is also to
see that the complaint is forwarded to the clerk at the same
time he causes bail papers, etc., to be sent to the clerk's office.
This use of a post-arrest document is not new as police current-
ly use "arrest slips" to set out the circumstances surrounding
the arrest. The committee felt that formalizing its use would be
a big help to the courts as an indication why the defendant
is before the court since it will be required to follow the defen-
dant through the court process. This is particularly acute when
there is a warrantless arrest. Also, current law puts the duty of
getting the defendant before the court on the arresting officer.
In reality, the defendant is often left at the jail and the officer
13 KY. R. ChaM. P. 3.02(2) (1981) [hereinafter cited as RCr]. The amended rules ap-
pear in West's Kentucky Decisions as In re: Order Amending Kentucky Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 610-618 S.W.2d at XCVII-CXXVIII (June 12, 1981).
14 RCr3.02(3).
'5 Id.
16 RCr3.02(4).
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is miles away before the judge can see the defendant. Thus, the
burden is shifted to the jailer in this rule. However, with the
pretrial system and pretrial release officers this burden, if any,
will be at a minimum. 7
While the Kentucky Supreme Court did not adopt the
proposed commentary, it is clear that the purpose of the require-
ment of a post-arrest complaint is to provide a charging instru-
ment in cases initiated by warrantless arrest. A proper post-arrest
complaint will inform the district judge of the reason why the ac-
cused is before the court, and can be acted on by the judge, the
prosecutor and the defense attorney.
The post-arrest complaint must state facts constituting prob-
able cause; conclusory statements will not meet the letter or the
spirit of the rule. 8 There is, however, no remedy provided in the
rules for a defective post-arrest complaint, and it is likely that
district judges will deal with the problem in different ways. In
Gerstein v. Pugh,9 the United States Supreme Court held that
the fourth amendment requires a judicial determination of prob-
able cause as a prerequisite to an extended restraint of liberty fol-
lowing a warrantless arrest. The Gerstein Court declared that a
system providing for extended detention on the basis of a prose-
cutor's information worked an unreasonable seizure of those so
detained.0 1Cr 3.02, as amended, remedies the constitutional
defect in the previous Kentucky practice, if it can be assumed
that an unverified complaint can be relied on to present the facts
to the district judge, 2' and if district judges will consider defense
motions to dismiss defective complaints and release the accused
from custody. The Ken.,vuky Supreme Court now requires a
post-arrest complaint setting out facts constituting probable
17 Commentary to Proposed Amendments to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure
8-9 (1980) (on file with the Kentucky Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Com-
mittee Report].
18 See RCr 3.02(2). RCr 2.02 defines a complaint as "a written statement of the es-
sential facts constituting the offense charged."
19 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
2D Id. at 112-19.
21 Gerstein did not address the issue of whether an unsigned statement could be re-
lied on by a judge in making a probable cause determination. The "oath or affirmation"
requirement is a part of the warrant clause of the fourth amendment, but in Gerstein the
Court was construing the "reasonableness" clause of the fourth amendment, which is ap-
1981-82]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
cause; this rule would seem to contemplate a judicial remedy for
a defective complaint, and it is likely that district judges will
fashion such a remedy either in the form of outright dismissal or
in an order providing for dismissal if an adequate complaint is
not filed promptly.
The Kentucky Supreme Court also eliminated the require-
ment that an accused be taken before a judge within twelve
hours in the absence of exceptional circumstances.2 Since the
rule now requires that the accused be taken before a judge "with-
out unnecessary delay," the Court may have thought the twelve
hour provision was superfluous. Nevertheless, the elimination of
this requirement may be interpreted as a signal that delays of
more than twelve hours are acceptable.2 Furthermore, the
amended rules seem to contemplate that the peace officer mak-
ing a warrantless arrest will take the accused first to the judge if
there is a judge available in the county, and that only if a judge is
not available may the officer take the accused to jail.
In one respect, however, RCr 3.02 was amended to conform
to prevailing practice rather than work a change on existing
criminal procedures and practices. RCr 3.02(3) gives the jailer
authority to hold someone left in his custody by a peace officer
and makes it the responsibility of the jailer to take the accused
before the judge if he is not released on bond, qualified again,
however, by the troublesome "without unnecessary delay" provi-
sion. RCr 3.02(3) and RCr 3.02(4) provide that all papers relat-
ing to the arrest (which would include the post-arrest complaint)
plicable to all searches and seizures, whether supported by warrant or not. The thrust of
the majority opinion in Gerstein is that any state procedure which provides a fair and reli-
able determination of probable cause as a condition for significant pre-trial restraint will
satisfy the requirements of the fourth amendment. Though not under oath a peace offi-
cer's statement of facts deserves a presumption of sincerity by virtue of his position and be-
cause a false statement of fact in a post-arrest complaint would be evidence of a misde-
meanor-either KRS § 522.030 (1975) (official misconduct) or KRS § 523.100 (1975)
(falsification to authorities). If this analysis is correct, Kentucky's current practice of re-
quiring a signed, but unsworn, statement of facts satisfies Gerstein.
2 See RCr 3.02(2).
23 Perhaps by oversight the 12 hour provision of RCr 4.20 was not eliminated. RCr
4.20 provides that "[b]efore said waiver [by executing a bail bond in accord with the mis-
demeanor schedule] is effective, the defendant must be informed of his right to appear be-
fore a judge without unnecessary delay, in no event more than twelve hours, and to be
considered for release bn personal recognizance." Id. (emphasis added).
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are to be delivered with the accused to the jailer whose responsi-
bility it then is to take the papers to the court clerk by the next
business day.24
B. Arrests Pursuant to Warrant
Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that "no
warrant shall issue to... seize any person... without describ-
ing [him] as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause sup-
ported by oath or affirmation." z Section 10 is substantially the
same as the warrant clause of the fourth amendment of the
United States Constitution. The Kentucky criminal rules imple-
ment the constitutional provisions by requiring a complaint
under oath setting out the essential facts constituting the of-
fense.28 This complaint must be reviewed by a judicial officer for
an independent determination of probable cause,27 and the arrest
warrant must particularly describe the person to be arrested. 2
While the peace officer making the arrest is not required to
have a copy of the warrant in his possession,28 the rules as
amended require that a copy of the warrant and complaint be
served on the accused at the time of arrest or as soon thereafter as
practicable. 3° It can be anticipated that cases will arise in which
the defendant is not served with a copy of the complaint and
warrant, but such a failure should be treated as a mere technical
defect. Noncompliance should neither invalidate the arrest nor
24 RCr3.02(3); RCr3.02(4).
25 Ky. CONST. § 10.
2 RCr2.02.
27 The judicial officer may be a circuit judge or district judge, or even a circuit clerk
in the event that the prosecutor certifies there is no judge available in the county. KRS §
15.725 (Cum. Supp. 1980). The Supreme Court has held that a clerk may act as a judicial
officer for the purpose of issuing warrants if the clerk is capable of making the determina-
tion of probable cause and is independent of the prosecutor. Shadwick v. City of Tampa,
407 U.S. 345, 354 (1972). It appears that the Kentucky statute compromises the neutrality
of the clerk by providing that the clerk may issue warrants prepared by the Common-
wealth Attorney or County Attorney. Nevertheless a panel of the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals has upheld the constitutionality of KRS § 15.725. Commonwealth v. Bertram, 596
S.W.2d 379 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
28 RCr 2.06.
29 RCr2.10(1).So RCr 2.06(4).
1981-82]
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cause the suppression of anything seized incident to arrest.,"
The 1981 amendments work a minor change in the require-
ments for a warrant. As amended the rules require the judge to
state on the warrant the type of security required, if any, for
bailable offenses.3 2 This change apparently requires the judicial
officer to refer to the bail schedule for misdemeanors and viola-
tions.33 Felonies are not bailable by reference to a preset sched-
ule.-
As amended, the rules make clear that the arresting officer is
to make his return on the warrant and deliver it, together with a
copy of the complaint, to the court in which the warrant is re-
turnable. 5 It would seem that if the arresting officer does not
have the warrant and complaint in his possession at the time of
the arrest, he should obtain these papers, serve them on the ac-
cused, and reflect both the arrest and the service of papers in his
return.
C. Arrests Pursuant to Bench Warrant
The amended rules purport to codify existing practice with
respect to the issuance of bench warrants.6 If a witness fails to
appear in response to a subpoena or a defendant fails to appear in
response to a summons, the judge may issue a warrant "from the
bench" for that person's arrest. Failure to respond to a police-
man's citation will not support the issuance of a bench warrant,
31 See Little v. Commonwealth, 438 S.W.2d 527 (Ky. 1969).
32 RCr2.06(3).
33 This bail schedule appears in Appendix A to the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure.
34 See RCr 4.04(3); RCr 4.16(3); RCr 4.20(1). It is believed that many district courts
maintain informal schedules for felonies to enable arrested persons to post a pre-set bail
without a court hearing. This practice is not sanctioned by the criminal rules.35 BCr 2.12(1).
36 RCr 2.05. The proposed commentary to RCr 2.05 stated:
This officially recognizes ... the existence of "bench warrants,"
which issue from the judge without a supporting affidavit or complaint.
While these warrants are common in practice, the Committee felt that it
was important to give them some basis in the rules, particularly since they
are not the same as regular warrants of arrest.
Advisory Committee Report, supra note 17, at 4.
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because a policeman is not a judicial officer.Y1 The policeman
must first swear to a complaint setting out the facts of the under-
lying offense; the judge may then issue a warrant based on this
document.
D. Criminal Cases Initiated by Summons
A criminal summons is another method of initiating a crim-
inal case. The summons is similar to a warrant in form and is also
signed by a judicial officer after finding that a sworn complaint
sets out probable cause. The crucial difference between a war-
rant and a summons is that a summons commands the defendant
to appear before the court on a certain date, while a warrant is a
command to peace officers to take the defendant into custody
and bring him before the court.s Obviously a summons is less
burdensome than a warrant; the rules and statutes require that
summonses be used for most violations and encourage the use of
summonses in other situations. Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
section 431.410 makes the use of summonses (as opposed to war-
rants) mandatory for most violationse (a violation being an of-
fense punishable only by fine), and RCr 2.04 permits the court to
issue a summons, rather than a warrant, for any offense if the
court believes the defendant will respond to a summons. 40 If the
defendant is a corporation, it must be summoned rather than ar-
rested. 41 The 1981 amendments encourage the use of summonses
through two minor changes. In addition to personal service on
the defendant or an adult member of the household, 42 the sum-
37 See KRS § 431.015(3) (Curn. Supp. 1980). It would be unconstitutional to issue a
bench warrant on the basis of non-appearance in response to a citation. In such a case
there would be no statement under oath of the essential facts of the underlying offense,
and such a statement under oath is required by both the Kentucky Constitution and the
United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; KCONST. § 10.
38 See RCr2.06.
39 KRS § 431.410 (Cum. Supp. 1980). See note 9 supra for a description of what con-
stitutes a "violation." See note 10 supra for a list of violations that can be the subject of ar-
rest, rather than summons or citation. See the text accompanying note 45 infra for a dis-
cussion of the requirements for issuing a warrant.40 RCr 2.04.
41 Id.
SSee RCr2.10(2)(a).
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mons may now be served by certified mail43 or by an officer who
does not have a summons in his possession issuing the defendant a
citation containing the information in the summons. 44
While ordinarily a warrant may not be issued for a violation,
KRS section 431.410 provides that a warrant may issue if the ju-
dicial officer reviewing the complaint finds one or more of the
following circumstances:
(1) The defendant previously has failed to respond to a cita-
tion or summons for an offense; or
(2) He has no ties to the community and there is a substantial
likelihood that he will refuse to respond to a summons; or
(3) The whereabouts of the defendant are unknown and the is-
suance of an arrest warrant is necessary in order to subject him
to the jurisdiction of the court; or
(4) Where arrest is necessary to prevent imminent bodily harm
to the accused or to another; or
(5) For any other good and compelling reason as determined
by the judicial officer.4 '
Between 1976, the effective date of KRS section 431.410, and
1981, there was a conflict between the statute and the applicable
criminal rule.46 The rule gave the court unfettered discretion to
43 RCr 2.10(2)(b). The rule permits service by mail as provided in KY. R. Cir. P.
4.01(1)(a) [hereinafter cited as CR] at the direction of the judge or the prosecutor. The
proposed commentary to RCr 2.10 stated in part:
Since a summons is a less harsh form of getting a person before the court, the
Committee wanted to facilitate its use. In some parts of the state, personal
service of a warrant is becoming difficult and personal service of a summons
by peace officers is almost an impossibility. Service by mail is the only prac-
tical solution.
Advisory Committee Report, supra note 17, at 6.
44 RCr 2.10(2)(c). The proposed commentary further stated:
[T]his rule permits execution of a summons which is not in the possession of a
peace officer by the issuance of a citation containing the pertinent informa-
tion. Just as it is not necessary to have a warrant in hand when executing it,
the Committee felt that there might be situations where an officer, knowing
a summons had been issued, could supply the defendant with the informa-
tion at the time he is with the defendant. This will assist peace officers, and
may likewise assist some defendants who might otherwise be served in the
middle of the night.
Advisory Committee Report, supra note 17, at 6.
45 KRS § 431.410 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
46 See Former RCr 2.04(1) (17 KRS Cum. Supp. 1980) (amended 1981).
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issue warrants for the commission of violations whereas the sta-
tute expressly defined a court's power. The 1981 amendments
eliminated this conflict by expressly referring to KRS section
431.410 in defining the power of courts to issue warrants. 47
E. Cases Initiated by Citation
A citation is a document written by a peace officer and given
to a person who has committed a violation or misdemeanor in the
officer's presence. 48 The citation is signed by the officer and is an
invitation to appear in court on the date specified. 41 Most cita-
tions are for traffic offenses punishable by fine, payable in ad-
vance of the court date.s5 The citation serves as the charging
document in traffic offenses as well as fish and wildlife offenses. 51
It is more analogous to a complaint than to a warrant or a sum-
mons. One question which may arise is whether a citation can
serve as a post-arrest complaint. It is likely that it can, provided
it states facts describing the offense. The officer could merely is-
sue the citation to the person placed under arrest, and substitute
the word "ARRESTED" for the date of the court appearance. 52
F. Right to Contact an Attorney
RCr 2.14 previously provided that a person arrested and in
jail had the immediate right to contact an attorney.s The 1981
amendments worked two changes which the Advisory Commit-
tee felt to be declaratory of the present state of the law. The rule,
47 RCr 2.04(l).
48 KRS § 431.015(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980); KRS § 431.450 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
49 KRS § 431.015(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
50 See KRS § 431.451 (Cum. Supp. 1980); KRS § 431.452 (Cum, Supp. 1980).
51 RCr 6.02(2). Unfortunately this rule does not provide that the citation can be used
as a charging instrument in all cases in which a citation has been properly issued. An offi-
cer may issue a citation for a misdemeanor committed in his presence, rather than take the
defendant to jail. There is no logical reason why the citation should not serve as the charg-
ing instrument in such a case. Under RCr 6.02(2), however, the citation cannot serve as
the charging instrument and the prosecutor must file an information or complaint. See the
text accompanying notes 112-14 infra for a discussion of the requirement of a charging in-
strument.
5' See KRS § 431.015(4) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
53 Former RCr 2.14 (17 KRS Cum. Supp. 1980) (amended 1981).
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as amended, provides that a person in custody (rather than in
jail) has the right to contact an attorney as soon as practicable
(rather than immediately).- The commentary of the Advisory
Committee stated in part:
The "as soon as practicable" provision takes into account the
fact that an attorney is not practicable when a defendant is in
the squad car. On the other hand, it also recognizes that if the
police intend to interrogate a person in the squad car, that per-
son is entitled to have an attorney present.r5
Certainly the defendant has a right to the presence of counsel
if the police intend to subject him to custodial interrogation.e
The United States Supreme Court has held, however, that the
right to have counsel present during lineups7 or during non-cus-
todial questioninge does not attach until the commencement of
formal court proceedings. It is possible, though unlikely, that the
Kentucky courts would view RCr 2.14 as guaranteeing a right to
counsel prior to the commencement of proceedings for purposes
other than custodial interrogation.5 9
II. PRE-TRIAL MATTERS
A. Initial Appearance
At the initial appearance the district judge shall: (1) advise
u4 RCr 2.14(1).
55 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 17, at 7.
0 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
57 Kirbyv. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
58 Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
59 KRS § 31.110(2)(a) (1980) (one of the statutes in the chapter on the Office of Pub-
lic Advocacy) states that a needy person is entitled to "be counseled and defended at all
stages of the matter beginning with the earliest time when a person providing for his own
counsel would be entitled to be represented by an attorney." Therefore, if there is a right
to retain counsel for all purposes during the post-arrest pre-court appearance stage, there
is also a right to appointed counsel during this period. In Cane v. Commonwealth, 556
S.W.2d 902 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977), however, a Kentucky appellate court stated that the
right to counsel guaranteed by § 11 of the Kentucky Constitution is no greater than the
right of counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution. Id.
at 906. It is doubtful that the Kentucky appellate courts would interpret RCr 2.14 and
i
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the defendant of the charge against him, of his right to remain si-
lent, and of his right to'a preliminary hearing or trial;60 (2) advise
the defendant of his right to counsel and appoint an attorney if
the defendant is a "needy" person; 6' and (3) fix conditions for
pre-trial release unless pre-set bond has been posted.62 In addi-
tion, the district judge should be able to consider the adequacy of
any post-arrest complaint on a defense motion to dismiss.63
The 1981 amendments moved the criminal rule providing for
appointment of counsel from the chapter governing post-indict-
ment proceedings to the chapter covering initial appearances,
where such a rule logically belongs.64 The rule, as amended, re-
fers specifically to the statute which defines "needy person,"''
but it is in conflict with the statutes that define the offenses for
which counsel must be appointed. 6 Those statutes provide that
counsel must be appointed for any offense punishable by confine-
ment or by a fine of $500 or more, but the rule as amended pro-
vides for the appointment of counsel only if imprisonment is pos-
KRS § 31.110 (1980) as giving an arrestedperson a statutory (as opposed to constitutional)
right to counsel, violation of which could result in suppression of evidence. It is more likely
that the Kentucky courts would either interpret the rule and statute as declarative of con-
stitutional rights or view the rule and statute as providing a nonconstitutional right to
counsel without the remedy of excluding evidence taken in violation thereof.
6) RCr3.05.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 See the text accompanying note 21 supra for discussion of the judicial remedy for a
defective post-arrest complaint.
64 The provision for appointment of counsel previously appeared as Former RCr
8.04 (17 KRS Cum. Supp. 1980) (abolished 1981) and now appears as RCr 3.05(2). RCr
8.30, which sets out the requirements for appointment of counsel in multiple defendant
cases, should have been moved also.
6 KRS § 31.120(3) (Cure. Supp. 1980) provides that it shall be prima facie evidence
that a person is not entitled to counsel paid for by the Commonwealth if he: a) owns real
estate; or b) is not receiving or eligible for public assistance; or c) has paid (by or for him-
self) money bail to secure his release; or d) owns more than one motor vehicle. The judge
may order the accused to pay for all or part of the cost of his defense. See KRS S 31.120(4)
(Cur. Supp. 1980).
6 Compare RCr 3.05 with KRS § 31.100(4) (1980) and KRS S 31.110 (1980). The
statutes require appointment of counsel if the crime is punishable by a fine of $500 or
more. While there is no constitutional mandate to provide counsel unless punishment is
actually imposed, Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), the Kentucky legislature has clear-
ly created a state right to counsel if the crime is punishable by imprisonment or fine of
$500 or more. KRS § 31.110 (1980).
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sible. While there are no offenses within the penal code punish-
able by a fine of $500 or more, but not punishable by imprison-
ment, 67 there are such offenses outside the penal code6 and one-
first offense driving under the influence69-is very common. It is
unclear how appellate courts will resolve this conflict between
the statutes and amended rules. 70
B. Bail
The 1981 amendments made numerous minor changes in the
criminal rules governing bail. RCr 4.34 provides that if a bail
bond is to be secured by real estate, the unencumbered equity of
the real estate must be at least double the amount of the bond.71
RCr 4.40 requires a judge denying a request for a change in the
conditions of release to record his reasons in writing.72 RCr 4.42
states that the return of an indictment shall not, of itself, be
treated as a material change in circumstances which would justi-
fy an increased bond. 73 RCr 4.43 codifies the procedures for ap-
pellate review of circuit court decisions concerning bail-a rule
adopted in response to Abraham v. Commonwealth,74 which
held that appeal is the proper method of reviewing bond deci-
sions of circuit judges. Finally, RCr 4.54 makes it clear that juris-
diction over bail passes immediately to the circuit judge on the
binding over of the defendant at the preliminary hearing and re-
mains with the circuit judge until the case is completed. 75
C. Preliminary Hearings
Preliminary hearings will be conducted differently under the
67 See KRS § 534.040(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980); KRS § 532.090 (1975).
68 See KRS § 189.990(2) (a) & (b) (1980).
69 KRS § 189.520(2) (1980); KRS § 189.990(9)(a) (1980).
70 See the text accompanying notes 92-94 infra for a discussion of Lunsford v. Com-
monwealth, 436 S.W.2d 512 (Ky. 1969).
7' RCr4.34(5).
72 RCr4.40(2).
73 RCr4.42(6).
74 565 S.W.2d 152 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). Abraham further held that review of a dis-
trict court bail decision is by writ of habeas corpus filed in the circuit court.
75 RCr4.54.
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1981 amendments. The receipt of hearsay is expressly provided
for;76 suppression motions and objections to evidence on constitu-
tional grounds are not permitted;" and strict time limits are im-
posed for the holding of preliminary hearings. 78
The preliminary hearing is to be held within ten days of the
initial appearance if the defendant is in custody, and within
twenty days if he is not. 79 These time limits are to be extended
over the defendant's objection only on a "showing that extraordi-
nary circumstances exist and that delay is indispensable to the in-
terests of justice."80 The sanction for failing to hold the prelim-
inary hearing within the time limits is the discharge of the defen-
dant from custody or the exoneration of his bond, with the Com-
monwealth permitted to proceed thereafter only by indictment.8'
While the strict time limits place a burden on the prosecutor,
that burden is eased by the rule specifically providing for the re-
ceipt of hearsay.82 There is a question whether a district judge
may require the prosecutor to produce witnesses with firsthand
knowledge. The Advisory Committee's proposed comment to
RCr 3.14 stated in part: "This amendment expressly states that
[the] probable cause finding could be based on hearsay and other
otherwise inadmissible evidence. However, the court can require
a showing that admissible evidence will be available at trial."' If
the district judge has the authority to require a showing that ad-
missible evidence will be available at trial, it follows that the
judge can require the production of witnesses with firsthand
knowledge if he concludes that the offered hearsay is inherently
unreliable. District judges should, however, routinely admit lab-
oratory reports unless ambiguous or otherwise suspect.
The rule as amended provides that the defendant may intro-
76 RCr3.14(2).
77 RCr 3.14(3).
78 RCr3.10(2).
791d. The Advisory Committee proposed 20 days if in custody, 45 days if not. Advis-
ory Committee Report, supra note 17, at 10, 11. The Kentucky Supreme Court opted for
the time limits usedin FED. R. CrM. P. 5.
8o RCr3.10(2).81 Id.
82 See RCr3.14(2).
8 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 17, at 12.
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duce witnesses in his own behalf.84 The testimony of such wit-
nesses must, however, be relevant to the probable cause determi-
nation. The defendant should not be permitted to use the prelim-
inary hearing as a discovery device to call and interrogate pro-
spective witnesses under the guise of introducing evidence "in his
own behalf."
As before, the Commonwealth has the right to call its wit-
nesses for examination, notwithstanding waiver of the prelim-
inary hearing by the defendant." The Supreme Court, however,
amended RCr 7.22, which had permitted the receipt at trial of
preliminary hearing testimony of a witness who would be un-
available. As amended, RCr 7.22 does not permit the receipt of
preliminary hearing testimony of such an unavailable witness.87
This change removes the major incentive for a prosecutor to call
his witnesses in the face of a waiver of preliminary hearing.
The other change in the rules governing preliminary hearings
is found in the modification and renumbering of former RCr
2.08. RCr 3.13, as it is now known, permits the amendment of a
defective complaint to fit the facts as they are determined to be
before or during the preliminary hearing, subject to the caveat
that amendment is not permitted if substantial rights of the de-
fendant would be prejudiced thereby." While RCr 3.13 is
straightforward, two problems remain. First, it is not clear whe-
ther the rule is applicable to misdemeanors and violations. The
significance of this problem is apparent from an examination of
84 RCr3.14(2).
85 See United States v. King, 482 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (upholding trial court's
refusal to allow rape defendant to call alleged victim as witness at preliminary hearing).
86 RCr3.10(3).
87 See RCr 7.22. The history of RCr 7.22 is circular. Prior to 1978 the rule provided
that a "duly authenticated transcript of testimony given by a witness in a previous trial of
the same defendant on the same charge in the same court shall be the equivalent of a depo-
sition." Former RCr 7.22 (17 KRS Bound Volume (1972)) (amended 1978). In Common-
wealth v. Bugg, 514 S.W.2d 119 (Ky. 1974); the Court hild that the rule precluded the use
of preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness. In 1978 the Court amended
the rule to provide for the receipt of preliminary hearing testimony. The official comment
stated: "This rule broadens the rule to include testimony in an examining trial at which
the defendant and his attorney were present." Comment to Former RCr 7.22 (17 KRS
Cum. Supp. 1980) (amended 1981). In 1981 the Court changed the rule, again forbidding
the admission of preliminary hearing testimony of unavailable witnesses. RCr 7.22.
88 RCr 3.13.
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RCr 6.16, the other criminal rule applicable to amendments.
That rule provides for amendment of indictments, informations,
complaints and citations provided that the substantial rights of
the defendant are not prejudiced and further provided that no
additional or different offense is charged. 9 Thus, RCr 6.16 can-
not be relied on in the trial of a misdemeanor or violation if the
complaint or citation charges the defendant with a crime differ-
ent from that supported by the proof. RCr 3.13 contains no such
limitation but appears on its face to be limited to amending the
charging instrument in felony cases in district court.1° Thus, it is
uncertain whether there is any authority for a district judge to
amend a complaint or citation to correspond to the facts pro-
duced in the trial of a misdemeanor or violation. The second
problem is that the rule does not clearly provide a remedy if the
post-arrest complaint is subject to dismissal at the initial appear-
ance. The district judge should be able to hold the defendant in
custody for a brief period (perhaps twenty-four hours) while a
proper post-arrest complaint is prepared. The rule does not cover
this situation, for it speaks only in terms of holding a defendant
in custody if it appears to the judge that there is probable cause.
At the initial appearance there will be no way for the judge to
make this determination except on the basis of the post-arrest
complaint. If that instrument is defective, and the officer is not
present, it is not clear whether the judge has authority to con-
tinue custody while a proper post-arrest complaint is prepared.
D. Peace Bonds
Peace bonds ("bail for good behavior") were previously the
subject of a criminal rule9l in the chapter titled "Proceedings be-
89 RCr 6.16. Because one accused of a felony has a right under the Kentucky Consti-
tution to be proceeded against only after indictment by a grand jury, it would be unconsti-
tutional to permit a prosecutor to amend an indictment to charge a new offense. See Ky.
CONST. § 12. There is no constitutional barrier to a rule permitting free amendment of in-
formations, complaints and citations, provided the defendant is not prejudiced thereby.
90 See RCr 3.13. The rule does, however, speak about a defendant appearing in re-
sponse to a summons or citation, which would imply that it is applicable to misdemeanors
and violations.
91 Former RCr 3.06 (17 KRS Cum. Supp. 1980) (abolished 1981).
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fore the Magistrate." The Kentucky Supreme Court abolished
the rule as inconsistent with the case of Lunsford v. Common-
wealth,92 which held that an earlier criminal rule authorizing
peace bonds was unconstitutional as an encroachment on the
powers of the legislature. The Court in Lunsford deemed peace
bonds to be matters of substance, not procedure, and hence with-
in the province of the legislature rather than the judiciary. The
effect of Lunsford was to resurrect the old Criminal Code provi-
sions93 thought to have been repealed upon the passage of the
criminal rules. The peace bond provisions in the old code are of
doubtful constitutionality, but they are the law in Kentucky un-
til repealed by the legislature or successfully challenged in
court.94
III. GRAND JURIES
The 1981 amendments worked a number of minor changes
and one major change in the functioning of the grand jury. The
major change requires the prosecutor to record all grand jury tes-
timony and to make the recording or a transcript thereof avail-
able to defense counsel prior to trial.'- While the Supreme Court
rejected most of the discovery recommendations of the Advisory
Committee, in this instance the Court went further than the
recommendation of the committee. The committee recom-
mended that recording be required only in cases originating with
the grand jury. The committee would not have required record-
ing in cases in which there had been a preliminary hearing, since
grand jury testimony could be expected to be substantially the
92436 S.W.2d 512 (Ky. 1969).
93 KY. CRiM. CODE §§ 382-393(1877).
94 For example, Ky. CRIM. CODE § 384 (1877) provides for the setting of a peace
bond (and the incarceration of the accused if he cannot post the bond) on the court's being
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing the defendant will commit an of-
fense. The Constitution requires as a condition for the imposition of criminal punishment
that the trier of fact find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of having com-
mitted each element of the offense. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). It is thought that
the benefits of the peace bond can be obtained by finding the accused guilty of the under-
lying offense and imposing as a term of probation the condition of "keeping the peace."
For a discussion of peace bonds and the Lunsford case, see Henley, RCr 3.06: Today's
Peace Bond, Ky. BENCHAND B., Apr. 1978, at 20.
95 Cr5.16.
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same as that given at the examining trial.9 The Court, however,
mandated recording and disclosure in all cases, 1' and it can be ex-
pected that part of the routine discovery request will be for a
copy of the grand jury testimony. The Court also amended the
secrecy requirements to permit counsel to disclose such informa-
tion as may be necessary for trial or other disposition.8 Perhaps
by oversight, the Court did not strike the requirement that the
indictment be indorsed with the names of the grand jury wit-
nesses.w
It is significant that the rule requires recordation of all testi-
mony before the grand jury, rather than all proceedings before
that body. 110 The prosecutor is thus able to speak "off the record"
without fear that his remarks will prove embarrassing later.'0'
The Court effected a number of minor changes in the rules
governing grand juries. Rejecting the committee's recommenda-
tion that a witness have a limited right to counsel in the grand
jury room, 0 2 the Court did provide that a witness can be accom-
panied by his parent, custodian or guardian if the witness is a
minor or person under disabilityA" The rules now provide that
the grand jury is to be told specifically of its power to exclude the
prosecutor while questioning witnesses and of its rights and
9 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 17, at 30.
97 See RCr 5.16.
98 RCr5.24.
9 See RCr 6.08.
100 The comparable federal rule requires recordation of all proceedings except when
the grand jury is deliberating or voting. FED. R. CanM. P. 6(3)(1). Under the federal rules,
however, there is no general pre-trial right to grand jury testimony. Grand jury testimony
must be produced after a witness testifies at trial. FED. R. CrM. P. 26.2.
101 In two recent federal cases, indictments were dismissed because of what the
courts considered to be misconduct by the prosecutors. In United States v. Sears Roebuck,
29 Canm. L. REP. (BNA) 2394 (C.D. Ca. June 26, 1981), the prosecutor commented un-
fairly on witnesses' testimony and voiced his personal views about the economic issues in
the case. In United States v. McKenzie, 30 CnIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2055 (E.D. La. Sept. 10,
1981), the prosecutor misled the grand jury about matters of law and in effect tookpart in
the deliberations.
102 The committee proposed that a witness have the right to an attorney for the sole
purpose of advising the witness of his privilege against self-incrimination. The committee's
proposed comment described the difficulties with the current practice, which requires
that a witness must leave the room to consult with his attorney waiting in the hall. Advis-
ory Committee Report, supra note 17, at 29.
103 RCr5.18.
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duties in regard to juvenile cases. 14 Requests by the defendant to
testify or to otherwise present evidence must be conveyed by the
prosecutor to the grand jury foreman, though the grand jury is
under no obligation to hear the evidence1lo The Court elim-
inated the word "competent" from RCr 5.10 so that the rule now
provides that the grand jurors shall find an indictment when they
have received what they believe to be sufficient evidence to sup-
port it. This change is merely declaratory of the existing law.16
Finally, the rules provide that a grand jury can refer a case in
writing to the next grand jury. If the second grand jury does not
indict within sixty days of the referral order, the defendant is en-
titled to discharge from custody or exoneration of his bond.' 7
IV. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION
Three changes in the chapter entitled "Indictment and Infor-
mation" deserve mention. The most important change enables a
defendant to waive indictment and consent instead to be pro-
ceeded against by information1l 8 In construing a similar provi-
sion in the federal rules, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
104 RCr5.02.
105 RCr 5.08.
106 RCr 5.10 specifically provides that no indictment shall be quashed, nor convic-
tion reversed, on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to support the indict-
ment. Thus the provision in Former RCr 5.10 that the grand jury should indict on the
basis of sufficient competent evidence was meaningless because the sufficiency of the evi-
dence could not be attacked.
107 RCr 5.22(2). The proposed commentary to the rule stated in part:
This amendment permits a grand jury to refer a case to the next grand
jury without a defendant being entitled to discharge .... The Committee
was concerned that certain dangerous defendants... would flee upon be-
ing discharged when the only reason for their discharge was the fact that the
grand jury simply did not have sufficient time to hear the case.
Advisory Committee Report, supra note 17, at 32.
108 RCr 6.02(1). Section 12 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that no person
shall be proceeded against by information for an indictable offense. It is reasonably clear,
however, that this provision is not jurisdictional, but is rather for the protection of the ac-
cused and hence subject to waiver. Federal courts have held that a similar provision in the
fifth amendment is a personal right which may be waived. Barkman v. Sanford, 162 F.2d
592 (5th Cir. 1947); United States v. Gill, 55 F.2d 399 (D.N.M. 1931). Section 12 of the
Kentucky Constitution is part of the Bill of Rights of the 1891 Constitution. It is very un-
likely that a court would regard section 12 as jurisdictional and declare RCr 6.02 unconsti-
tutional.
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cuit said: "An impecunious accused, unable to furnish bail,
should not be required to languish in the common jail, with
nothing to do but gripe and grow mean in association with others
evilly inclined while waiting for the grand jury to convene."'1' 9
While it can be expected that most indictment waivers will be of-
fered by defendants who intend to plead guilty, the rule is also
for the benefit of those who choose to stand trial."(0 Unfortunate-
ly the rule does not state that the prosecutor must accept the in-
dictment waiver."' It is easy to foresee that some prosecutors
may decline to file an information in an attempt to keep the de-
fendant in jail until the grand jury meets or because the prosecu-
tor feels an indictment returned by a grand jury has probative ef-
fect before a trial jury.
Two other changes are worthy of mention. The rules now
provide, for the first time, for a charging instrument in all crim-
inal cases.112 The charging instrument gives notice and provides a
record for res judicata purposes. Under the new rule, the charg-
ing instrument may be an indictment, information, complaint
or, in the case of traffic or fish and wildlife offenses, a uniform
citation. While the rule does not list post-arrest complaints as in-
struments which will suffice as charging instruments, the word
"complaint" in RCr 6.02(2) should be construed to include post-
arrest complaints. A warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor or vi-
olation will be followed by a post-arrest complaint stating facts
which constitute probable cause."13 It would serve no purpose to
also require the prosecutor to file an information in the district
court. This unnecessary burden could be avoided by interpreting
the word "complaint" in RCr 6.02(2) as including post-arrest
complaints.
Because of the wording of RCr 6.02(2), however, it appears
'09 162F.2d at 594.
110 See Bartlettv. United States, 354 F.2d 745, 749 (8th Cir. 1966).
111 RCr 6.02 provides that the offense may be prosecuted by information in the event
of waiver; the rule does not say that in such event the offense sha!! be prosecuted by infor-
mation. In construing FED. R. CfiM. P. 7(b), the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that the United States Attorney was not required to file an information
since the federal rule used the language "may be prosecuted by information." Rattley v.
Irelan, 197 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
112 See RCr6.02(2).
113 RCr3.02(2).
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that the prosecutor will be required to file informations in dis-
trict court for violations other than traffic and fish and wildlife
violations as well as for misdemeanors initiated by citation.
Rather than simply providing that a citation may serve as the
charging instrument, RCr 6.02 limits the use of citations for this
purpose to violations of the traffic and game laws. If a peace offi-
cer issues a citation for a misdemeanor or violation other than
traffic or fish and wildlife, it appears that the prosecutor will also
need to file an information in the district court before a plea is
entered.
The other change to be noted is the elimination of the re-
quirement that an indictment include the colorful language,
"Against the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth of Ken-
tucky." 14
V. PRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE
Although the Kentucky Supreme Court declined to adopt the
liberal discovery rules proposed by the Advisory Committee, the
Court did make four significant changes in the chapter entitled
"Production of Evidence."115 One of these changes, the elimina-
tion of the provision for the receipt of preliminary hearing testi-
mony of an unavailable witness, has already been discussed.1 6
The change in this area which affects everyday trial practice
is the requirement that the prosecutor produce witness state-
ments before eliciting testimony." 7 Prior to 1981, the Common-
wealth was required to produce witness statements after direct
114 Former RCr 6.10(4) (17 KRS Cune. Supp. 1980) (amended 1981).
115 The committee proposed "open file" discovery under which the prosecutor would
have been required to turn over to the defense everyth ing relevant to the case except attor-
ney work-product. Proposed rule 7.32. The prosecution would also have been required to
give written notice of the names and addresses of potential witnesses and their criminal
records. Proposed rule 7.32. Some reciprocal discovery was provided. Proposed rule 7.34.
Drawn from the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, the committee's proposals went
far beyond what is provided in the federal rules and may have appeared radical to the
Kentucky Supreme Court. As a result, no change in the discovery rules was forthcoming
from the Court. For an excellent analysis of Kentucky discovery law, see Note, Conun-
drum of Criminal Discovery: Constitutional Arguments, ABA Standards, Federal Rules,
and Kentucky Law, 64 KY. L.J. 800 (1975-76).
116 See note 87 supra for a discussion of RCr 7.22.
117 RCr 7.26(1).
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examination. RCr 7.26 now provides that the court is to examine
the statement in camera if the prosecutor asserts that the state-
ment does not relate to the anticipated direct examination. On
such a claim, the judge is to examine the statement in light of the
prosecutor's statement of what the testimony will be, strike the
irrelevant portions, and turn the redacted statement over to de-
fense counsel."'
Another important change appears in RCr 7.02(2). For the
first time, courts are clearly authorized to compel the production
of documents by subpoena duces tecum prior to trial. The rule
states:
The court may direct that books, papers, documents or objects
designated in the subpoena be produced before the court at a
time prior to the trial or prior to the time when they are to be
offered in evidence and may upon their production permit the
books, papers, documents or objects or portions thereof to be
inspected by the parties and their attorneys." 9
This provision is borrowed from the federal rules 2° and
should be construed as the federal rule has been construed. As in-
terpreted by the federal courts, a subpoena duces tecum may is-
sue in the discretion of the trial judge for the pre-trial production
of evidentiary material in the hands of the government 2' or a
third party.'2 Evidentiary material is defined as material which
can be identified and which the party seeking discovery believes
in good faith may be admissible at trial. m The burden is on the
moving party to show that the subpoenaed material may be ad-
missible, that there is a need to inspect it prior to trial, and that
the material cannot be procured by other means.Y4 In the leading
118 RCr7.26(2).
'19 RCr7.02(2).
120 The quoted provision is taken from FED. R. CMM. P. 17(c). Advisory Committee
Report, supra note 17, at 37. The other material in RCr 7.02 combines three former rules,
Former RCr 7.02 (17 KRS Bound Volume (1972)) (amended 1981); Former RCr 7.04 &
7.08 (17 KRS Bound Volume (1972)) (abolished 1981), and spells out procedures which
had formerly been incorporated from the civil rules.
121 See Bowman Diary Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 219 (1951).
12 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 698 (1974).
123 Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. at 219-20.
124 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 699.
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case, United States v. Nixon,2 0 the United States Supreme Court
held that the judge did not err in finding that Special Prosecutor
Leon Jaworski had satisfied his burden with respect to desig-
nated Watergate tapes, even though Mr. Jaworski did not know
what was on them. The Court declared: "As for the remainder of
the tapes, the identity of the participants and the time and place
of the conversations, taken in their total context, permit a ration-
al inference that at least part of the conversations relate to the of-
fenses charged in the indictment."'' 2
Although RCr 7.02(2) provides a mechanism for compelling
the pre-trial production of materials in the hands of third par-
ties,' 7 the compulsory production of materials in the control of
the Commonwealth will continue to be governed by RCr 7.24,
the discovery rule. The latter rule permits a court to order the
prosecutor to disclose documents or other objects which may be
material to defense preparation. The cases interpreting the fed-
eral rule for subpoenas duces tecum have used a standard which
is substantially the same as a "may be material" standard. 2 1 It is
unlikely that the Kentucky courts will interpret the new Ken-
tucky rule as providing access to the prosecutor's files in addition
to that provided by RCr 7.24.'2 If the courts do interpret the
rules in this manner, the importance of RCr 7.02(2) is that it pro-
vides a means to compel production of documents and other ob-
jects in the hands of third parties.
The Court also changed the rules applicable to material wit-
nesses. Formerly the rule permitted a judge to fix bail for a wit-
ness on an ex parte showing that the testimony of the witness was
expected to be "material" and that reasonable grounds existed to
believe that it might be impracticable to secure the attendance of
125 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
126 Id. at 700.
127 It has been noted that the constitutional right to compulsory process should ex-
tend to the pre-trial production of materials in the hands of third parties in instances
where pre-trial examination is essential to proper presentation of the defense. D. MuR-
BELL, KENTucKy CRiMINAL PRACTICE 102-03 (1975).
128 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 699; United States v. Cuthbertson, 630
F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980).
129 For an example of what the Kentucky high court deems to be material to the de-
fense, see Punkey v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.2d 513 (Ky. 1972).
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the witness by subpoena.130 Implicit in the old rule was the power
of the court to issue a bench warrant for the arrest of the person
for whom bail was set and to hold him in custody until bail was
posted or his testimony obtained (by deposition or otherwise).
RCr 7.06, as amended, changes the standard from "mate-
rial" to "indispensable" and specifically incorporates the bail
provisions of Chapter IV. The rule further makes clear that a
witness incarcerated for failure to post bond can insist on giving
his testimony by deposition. Most importantly, bail cannot be
set-nor the witness arrested-until after a hearing at which the
witness is present and represented by counsel, unless waived. As
a practical matter this requirement will make it very difficult to
obtain the testimony of one who wishes to avoid process. It will
be necessary to first subpoena the person to a hearing on the issue
of whether he should be required to give bail as an indispensable
witness. If he fails to appear at the hearing, a bench warrant
may issue, but by that time the witness may have fled the juris-
diction or gone into hiding. Only if the witness is in custody on
another matter does it appear practicable to utilize the provisions
of the indispensable witness rule.131
VI. ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEADINGS
Only minor changes were made in Chapter VIII. To protect
the right of the Commonwealth to appeal adverse decisions ren-
dered prior to the attachment of jeopardy,132 the Court provided
that a trial court may not defer ruling on a pre-trial motion when
to do so would adversely affect the right of appeal.' The Court
also codified the power of trial courts to exclude defendants who
persist in disruptive conduct, 1' and further provided that defen-
13 Former RCr 7.06 (17 KRS Bound Volume (1972)) (amended 1981).
131 See RCr 7.06. By contrast, KRS § 421.240 (1972) enables any Kentucky judge to
order the arrest of a person wanted as a witness in another state on receipt of a certificate
from a judge of that state certifying that the person is a material witness and recommend-
ing immediate apprehension.
132 See KRS § 22A.020(4) (1980).
133 RCr 8.22. KRS § 22A.020(4)(a) (1980) provides, however, that an appeal by the
Commonwealth from an interlocutory order shall not stay the proceedings.
134 RCr 8.28(2). Cf. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (defendant lost right of
confrontation under sixth and fourteenth amendments through his disruptive trial behav-
ior).
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dants should not be forced to wear prisoners' garb or be displayed
in shackles before the jury.1- In another change, the Court modi-
fied the procedural rule on incapacity to stand trial to conform to
the statutory provisions.l1e
The Court did not accept the major proposals of the Advisory
Committee in Chapter VIII. Rejected were proposals to legit-
imize the plea of nolo contendre, 37 to make plea bargaining a
matter of public record,138 to make more specific the require-
ments of a voluntary and informed plea of guflty, 39 and to re-
quire suppression motions to be made prior to trial.140
VII. TRIAL
The Kentucky Supreme Court adopted certain provisions 4'
from Federal Rule 23 requiring written jury waivers42 and re-
quiring special findings of fact on request in cases tried to the
bench. 4 3 Since there is a right to jury trial in Kentucky for all of-
fenses, 14 including traffic violations, judges will be forced to no-
13 RCr 8.28(5). Cf. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (held no denial of due
process when defendant failed to raise objection with trial court as to being dressed in jail
clothing during trial).
136 RCr 8.06. The statute governing incapacity to stand trial is KRS § 504.040
(Cum. Supp. 1980). Lack of responsibility for criminal conduct as a result of mental dis-
ease or defect describes a mental state different from incapacity to stand trial. "Insanity"
at the time of the offense is an affirmative defense to be pleaded and proved by the defen-
dant. KRS S 504.020 (1975); KRS S 504.050 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
137 Proposed rule 8.08.
13 Proposed rule 8.09.
139 Proposed rule 8.08.
140 Proposed rule 8.18(c). The failure to adopt the proposed rule requiring suppres-
sion motions to be made prior to trial is inexplicable. Under the present rule, RCr 9.78, de-
fense counsel can object during trial to a confession or to the fruits of a search. Not only
will it delay the proceedings to conduct the required evidentiary hearing during trial, but
the objection is first brought to the court's attention after jeopardy has attached.
141 FED. R. CiuM. P. 23(a) & (c). These changes were not included in the Advisory
Committee Report to the Court.
142 RCr9.26(1).
143 RCr9.26(2).
144 KRS § 29A.270(1) (1980). The constitutional right to jury trial in Kentucky ex-
tends only to non-petty offenses. Hauck v. Starck, 64 S.W.2d 565, 566 (Ky. 1933). See KY.
CoNsr. §§ 7, 11. The United States Supreme Court has held that the dividing line be-
tween petty and non-petty offenses for purposes of the sixth amendment is six months im-
SuRVEY-CImiNAL RuLEs
tify all who plead not guilty (including the person accused of
running a stop sign) of the right to jury trial. If the defendant
states that he does not want a jury, the judge will be required to
have him sign a written waiver before hearing the case. The re-
quirement of special findings of fact should have the salutary ef-
fect of forcing judges to be familiar with the elements of various
offenses and to listen closely to the evidence. If the findings of
fact do not cover all elements of the offense, the conviction is sub-
ject to reversal. 15
The 1981 amendments redefine "harmless error"'4 and "sub-
stantial error"'147 to conform to the definitions of those terms in
the civil rules.'48 No substantive change is worked by these
amendments. It remains the law in Kentucky that an error is to
be disregarded if the court concludes, on a review of the entire
record, that there is no substantial possibility that the result
would have been different without the error. 149 Furthermore, it
remains the law that a reviewing court has discretion to grant re-
lief even though the complained of error was not preserved for
appeal, if failure to do so would cause "manifest injustice." 15 Un-
prisonment. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970). Kentucky has granted a statutory
right to jury trial for all offenses, including those which could constitutionally be tried to
the bench. KRS § 29A.270(1) (1980). Though not entirely free from doubt, it appears that
a written jury waiver will be required under RCr 9.26(1) for all bench trials, whatever the
offense. See United Statesv. Great Eastern Lines, 89F. Supp. 839,840 (E.D. Va. 1968).
145 See Haywood v. United States, 393 F.2d 780, 781-82 (Sth Cir. 1968).
146 Former RCr 9.24 (17 KRS Bound Volume (1972)) (amended 1981) stated the test
for harmless error in terms of error which "does not affect substantial rights." As amen-
ded, RCr 9.24 uses the same terminology but adds a provision that error is to be disre-
garded unless "the denial of such relief would be inconsistent with substantial justice."
147 Former RCr 9.26 (17 KRS Bound Volume (1972)) (amended 1981) defined sub-
stantial error to be when the court, on review of the whole case, was satisfied "that the
substantial rights of the defendant have been prejudiced." The substantial error rule has
been renumbered as RCr 10.26 and defined as "palpable error which affects the substan-
tial rights of a party" which may be considered though not preserved for review, if the ap-
pellate court believes that "manifest injustice has resulted from the error."
148 See CR 61.01; CR 61.02.
149 See, e.g., Niemeyer v. Commonwealth, 533 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1976); Stiles v.
Commonwealth, 570 S.W.2d 645 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
150 See Gunter v. Commonwealth, 576 S.W.2d 518, 522 (Ky. 1978); Sherley v.
Commonwealth, 558 S.W.2d 615, 618 (Ky. 1977); Tackett v. Commonwealth, 320
S.W.2d 299 (Ky. 1959).
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doubtedly the reviewing courts will continue to be very selective
in reviewing unpreserved errors.15'
It is important to note that the standard set out in the rules of
criminal procedure for reviewing harmless error is applicable
only to claims of error based on state law. If the defendant claims
that his rights under the United States Constitution have been vi-
olated, the reviewing court must apply the federal standard., 2
Though not entirely free from doubt,'0 the federal standard can
be said to require the appellate court to decide whether, in light
of the entire record, the untainted evidence establishes the guilt
of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.M Though worded dif-
ferently, the federal and state harmless error standards appear
capable of yielding substantially identical results. Under either
standard a review of the entire record is required and the court is
required to speculate what the result would have been had the
error not occurred. However the standard may be expressed, the
reviewing court should reverse unless it can say with certainty
that the result would have been the same.
An interesting minor change is found in RCr 9.72 ("Jury to
Take Exhibits"). The rule now permits jurors to take any notes
they have made into the jury room, but "upon request of either
party the jury shall be admonished that the notes... shall not
be given any more weight in deliberation than the memory of
15' Burch v. Commonwealth, 555 S.W.2d 955 (Ky. 1977).
152 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,21 (1967).
153 Compare Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (focusing solely on the error and
its logical relationship to the result) with Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254
(1969) and Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 431-32 (1972) (permitting consideration of
other evidence in the record supporting the verdict). See Goldberg, Harmless Error: Con-
stitutional Sneak Thief, 71J. CpdM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421,427-32 (1980).
Constitutional errors affecting the integrity of the proceedings are not subject to
the harmless error test. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 487-91 (1978) (conflict of in-
terest of appointed defense counsel); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (right to
jury drawn from cross section of the community); Bennett v. Commonwealth, 309
S.W.2d 183, 186 (Ky. 1958) (right under state constitution to impartial jury of the vicin-
age). The Supreme Court has never applied the harmless error standard to the receipt of
involuntary confessions, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 384, 398 (1978), though it is appar-
ent the Court would apply the standard to the receipt of confessions taken in violation of
Miranda. See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371,377-78 (1972).
l'4 Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 876 (5th Cir. 1980). This standard has been
criticized as permitting appellate judges to decide questions of fact on a cold record. Gold-
berg, supra note 153, at 430.
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other jurors."'-6 It is evidently the intent of the rule to give jurors
the right to take notes,s as well as the right to take those notes
into the jury room. While an admonition may be necessary to
prevent a juror who has taken notes from dominating the effort
of the jury to reconstruct the evidence, an admonition that notes
are not to be given any more weight than unaided memory is
contrary to common sense and runs counter to the purpose of tak-
ing notes. 57
In other minor changes, the Court set out a number of provi-
sions previously incorporated by reference to the civil rules'-" and
codified the requirement of Carter v. Kentucky'5 9 that the jury be
instructed on request that the defendant is not required to testify
and that the jury is to draw no inference of guilt from the failure
of the defendant to testify.160
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS CHANGES
The Court extended the right to seek collateral relief under
RCr 11.42 to those on probation, parole or conditional dis-
charge, 61 while eliminating the provision for reimbursement of
counsel appointed to represent rule 11.42 claimants.' 62 Another
change eliminated the rule requiring preference to be given on
appeal to criminal cases.163 In other changes, the Court made it
1 The Advisory Committee's commentary stated that the amendment expressly
permits the jury to take notes during trial. Advisory Committee Report, supra note 17, at
67. While the amendment does not expressly state that jurors are permitted to take notes,
it should be construed in accord with the intent of the committee and the Court (which
adopted the rule as it came from the committee).
156 Permitting note taking is in the discretion of the trial court in the absence of a sta-
tute or court rule. Watldns v. State, 393 S.W.2d 141,145-49 (Tenn. 1965).
157 If an admonition is to be given, it should be that notes are not a transcript and are
merely an aid to memory. See Toles v. United States, 308 F.2d 590, 594 (9th Cir. 1962).
1,8 The changes affect the following provisions: RCr 9.36 (challenge to jurors); RCr
9.44 (proof of official record); RCr 9.52 (avowals).
159 451 U.S. 288 (1981).
160 RCr9.54(3).
161 RCr 11.42(1).
162 Former RCr 11.42(9) (17 KRS Cum. Supp. 1980) (amended 1981). The Advisory
Committee's commentary stated that reimbursement is not necessary because a public de-
fender handles the cases.
163 Former RCr 12.74 (17 KRS Bound Volume (1972)) (amended 1981).
1981-82]
ENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
clear that judicial officers empowered to issue arrest warrants
can also issue search warrants and spelled out the requirements
for a peace officer's return on a search warrant. 16
CONCLUSION
While the 1981 amendments made significant changes in the
rules of criminal procedure, the Supreme Court rejected the pro-
posals which would have fundamentally altered the trial of crim-
inal cases: open file discovery and judge sentencing. Perhaps the
Advisory Committee's proposals on these topics were too ambi-
tious, ideas whose time had not yet come. It would be unfortu-
nate, however, if the Court were to regard the rejection of these
proposals as anything more than a temporary decision. Ken-
tucky's discovery rules are inadequate, and the present system of
jury sentencing requires a body of laymen to fix the defendant's
sentence without most of the information needed for the deci-
sion. It is to be hoped that interest on these topics will continue
and that the Court will be willing to make significant changes at
a future time.
"4 RCr 13.10.
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